13.

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Toxic-Tobacco Law 1 (the Bill)
2006 Annual Report
2005 Annual Report
Asia's Plan to Ban
Toxic-Tobacco Endgames: 1997-2007
2004 Annual Report
Regulating the FDA Helps Marlboro
Toxic-Tobacco Law in The Lancet
Surgeon General OK on Toxic-Tobacco Ban
Cancer Doctors Plan Prevention
Co$t-free Countermarketing
2003 Annual Report
2002 Annual Report
Toxic-Tobacco Law in the Journal of the American Medical Association
Philip Morris=Altria
Law Goes 'Round the World

Toxic-Tobacco Law 1 (the Bill)

To protect the public health by (1) making it illegal for corporations and other legal entities operating in the United States to manufacture, market, sell, or import cigarettes, cigars, little cigars, cigarillos, chewing tobacco, snuff, pipe tobacco, and cigarette tobacco for commercial trade, (2) providing to all stakeholders (e.g., farmers) an adjustment period of five years between the date of passage and date of implementation of this Act, while (3) allowing adult consumers 21 years of age and older to buy, make, import, possess and use toxic-tobacco products for their personal use.

Mr., Ms. (sponsors names) introduced the following bill, which was read once and referred to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions

To protect the public health by making it illegal for corporations and other legal entities operating in the United States to manufacture, market, sell, or import for commercial trade all toxic-tobacco products like cigarettes, cigars, little cigars, cigarillos, chewing tobacco, snuff, pipe tobacco, and cigarette tobacco.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled.

The Congress finds the following:

INTENDED EFFECT- Nothing in this Act shall be construed to

This Act prohibits corporations and other legal entities operating in the United States from manufacturing, marketing, selling, or importing for commercial trade all toxic-tobacco products including cigarettes, cigars, little cigars, cigarillos, chewing tobacco, snuff, pipe tobacco, and cigarette tobacco.

This Act will go into effect five years after enactment in order to provide all stakeholders (e.g., farmers) with an adjustment period.

This Act permits adult consumers to buy, make, import, possess and use toxic-tobacco products for their personal use.

This Act sets the purchasing age for all toxic-tobacco products at 21 years.

The Federal Government will tax all toxic-tobacco products imported by individual consumers.

Only unbranded, fire-safe (self-extinguishing paper) toxic-tobacco products, identified by a 2-digit code number, may be imported into the United States by individual consumers.

All packages of imported toxic-tobacco products must be covered (90%) by graphic, empirically based effective warnings of the diseases caused by the use of toxic-tobacco.

All cans and packs must be "oversized" so that they do not conveniently fit into shirt and pants pockets.

Tax revenues from imported toxic-tobacco products may only be used for prevention and cessation programs to reduce the use of toxic-tobacco products.

The Toxic-Tobacco Law will end all manufacturing and marketing of toxic-tobacco products and thus stop their widespread availability to children and adults at grocery, convenience, and drug stores, gasoline stations and vending machines.

There will be no advertising of toxic-tobacco products aimed at youth, young adult or adult markets in magazines such as Sports Illustrated or others.

Toxic-tobacco will no longer be ubiquitously entrenched in American society. Therefore, the advertising and retail milieu, devoid of toxic-tobacco products, will become an environment more conducive to quitting toxic-tobacco than the current one.

By removing all marketing of toxic-tobacco products and greatly reducing youth access, the Toxic-Tobacco Law will lead to lower rates of use among children.

Since use by peers strongly contributes to whether or not children experiment with toxic-tobacco,² the reduced availability of these products will diminish the impact of peer pressure on the initiation of toxic-tobacco use. Less peer pressure will result in fewer new consumers to replace those who have quit using toxic-tobacco or died from its effects.

From a public health policy perspective, the Toxic-Tobacco Law’s effect on reducing the number of "replacement users" will, in time, substantially reduce the incidence of cancer, cardiovascular disease, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, complications of pregnancy and home and commercial fires.

When the Toxic-Tobacco Law goes into effect, the "black market"¹⁰ for cigarettes, as currently constituted, will end.

The "black market" is now fueled by the great disparity among cigarette excise taxes that makes smuggling from states with low rates to states with high rates a lucrative illegal business. This condition will cease when the Law becomes effective because there no longer will be domestic toxic-tobacco products to tax.

There is no compelling reason to expect a new "black market" aimed at adults after the Law is passed because adults will be "free" to use toxic-tobacco products and buy them from their usual sources for five years. When the Law goes into effect, consumers will be "free" to import toxic-tobacco products for personal use and be "free" to use products that they have stored.

It is very unlikely that smuggled toxic-tobacco would become a substantial source, given the enormous amount of product that would have to come across the borders of the United States undetected to satisfy millions of adult users.

Why would foreign manufacturers and exporters of toxic-tobacco products, potentially the only large-scale sources for a "black market," risk supplying contraband that could be confiscated, when they can legally and profitably export to American consumers?

After the Law becomes effective, the federal government must monitor for any untoward effects caused by large numbers of individual consumers’ importing toxic-tobacco products. If problems arise with this method of supply, other methods will need to be considered, such as using "federal stores" supplied by products manufactured outside the United States or in factories taken over by the United States using its power of eminent domain.

To counter the possibility of a "black market" targeting minors, the United States must make agreements with supplier nations, requiring full documentation of all production and shipments of toxic-tobacco products.

In 1964 the Report of the Advisory Committee to the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service on Smoking and Health concluded, "cigarette smoking is a health hazard of sufficient importance in the United States to warrant appropriate remedial action."⁹ The Toxic-Tobacco Law is that "appropriate remedial action."

Discussion: Black markets.
As part of the debate on the proposed Toxic-Tobacco Law, those who argue that the Law would create a "black market" need to explain: a) why there would be a demand for "black market" products, b) where the products would come from, c) how they would cross borders undetected, d) what the societal costs of a "black market" would be vis-à-vis those of not passing the Law, and e) why they believe the United States is incapable of implementing creative solutions?

Discussion: Invasion of our global neighbors.
One undesirable consequence of the Law will be further efforts by the toxic-tobacco corporations to move their United States operations overseas to continue their invasion of our global neighbors. To counter this movement, our international neighbors may decide to pass legislation similar to the proposed Toxic-Tobacco Law. Similar legislation has been proposed in the Philippines (late Dr. Monfert) and South Korea (Dr. Park).

Discussion: Adjustment period.
The proposed 5-year adjustment period will give federal, state, and local governments sufficient time to plan for the loss of excise and sales tax revenues from domestic toxic-tobacco products. These revenues will, in part, be replaced by taxes on goods and services purchased with dollars no longer being spent on toxic-tobacco products, that is, "redistributed spending."¹⁷ These dollars will be spent by persons who quit using toxic-tobacco products, or never started to use them because they were affected by the "new environment" that the Law created — a milieu without advertising, marketing, or the ubiquitous venues for the sale of toxic-tobacco.

Managers of pension funds and others who invest in the toxic-tobacco industry will have sufficient time to restructure their portfolios. The adjustment period will also permit time for the resolution of a wide range of legal suits against the toxic-tobacco industry¹⁸ and for the states to collect a portion of the money stipulated in their 1998 settlement with the toxic-tobacco industry.¹⁹

Discussion. Farmers of toxic-tobacco.
Because the proposed adjustment period is five years, some older farmers of toxic-tobacco may be retired or near retirement age when the Law goes into effect. Eighty-five percent of Maryland's toxic-tobacco farmers accepted a buyout from their state and are no longer farming this crop.²⁰ The federal government has also implemented a buyout of toxic-tobacco quotas supported by the major toxic-tobacco growing states.²¹ Since the toxic-tobacco industry began importing greater amounts of foreign toxic-tobacco, fewer and fewer farms have been operational. Younger farmers of toxic-tobacco, or those considering this occupation, will know with five years "warning" that the domestic market for their crop will end.

The proposed 5-year adjustment period is also intended to allay any fear by addicted consumers that their current sources of toxic-tobacco will change in the near future. The nearly 50 million Americans who are addicted to toxic-tobacco products²² will have five years to a) buy from their usual sources, b) find foreign sources from whom they can legally import them after the adjustment period, or c) end their use of toxic-tobacco products.

Lastly, there are many precedents for adjustment periods before federal regulations are implemented. For example, the prohibition on leaded gasoline for highway use was enacted in late 1990, but did not become effective for five years.²³ Also, the Food and Drug Administration’s 1996 regulation prohibiting brand name sponsorship of sporting events, such as the Marlboro Grand Prix, stipulated an effective date in 1998.²⁴ Similarly, France’s ban of all toxic-tobacco advertising and sponsorship provided for a two year period "in order to allow time for various sectors of society to adjust to the restrictions".¹⁶

Discussion: Problems with the 5-year adjustment period.
The proposed 5-year interval between passage of the Toxic-Tobacco Law and its implementation may create several problems. First, and most challenging, is the possibility that during this period approximately 3-4 million American children could become addicted to toxic-tobacco,²⁵ and as a result, millions of them would succumb to cancer or diseases of the cardiovascular system or lung. Therefore, during this interval primary prevention efforts and cessation programs must be vigorously pursued. Second, the interval may make it more difficult to pass the Law because some members of Congress may not anticipate any rewards for their efforts in passing a Law, the benefits of which appear to be far in the future. Third, the interval gives the toxic-tobacco industry many years to lobby for repeal of the Law.

Discussion: Comparing the Toxic-Tobacco Law to Prohibition
Because the Toxic-Tobacco Law would ban the making and selling of a product as did Prohibition, it is reasonable to ask how the Law differs from Prohibition (18^th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution), which was repealed. Foremost, the Toxic-Tobacco Law does not seek to restrict adults from using toxic-tobacco, whereas Prohibition sought to stop Americans from consuming alcoholic beverages by banning their manufacture and sale. The purpose of the Toxic-Tobacco Law is to end the massive presence of toxic-tobacco products in American society, denormalize the use of toxic-tobacco, reduce youth access and addiction, and ultimately decrease morbidity and mortality.

The Toxic-Tobacco Law is singularly focused on improving the health of Americans by preventing and ending the addiction of children and adults, whereas health, moral, and economic arguments were used to pass the 18^th Amendment, from Carry Nation’s passionate belief that alcohol "rots the brain, body and soul"²⁶ to the Eastern United States industrialists’ fear that alcohol threatened their pool of reliable workers.²⁷ Nearly fourteen years after passage, the 18^th Amendment was repealed because the law was violated widely, crime and corruption abounded, the country was reeling in an economic depression, and fear arose that the authority of the states and the Constitution was deteriorating.²⁸

The era in which Prohibition was rejected and the era in which the Toxic-Tobacco Law is being proposed are very different. Prohibition was attempted at a time when the majority (>60%) of male adults were consumers of alcohol.²⁸ Today, approximately 20% of adult Americans regularly smoke toxic-tobacco and 70% of them state they want to quit. Furthermore, 46 million adults have quit smoking, 50% of those who have ever smoked.²² During Prohibition members of all educational-economic levels consumed alcohol;²⁸ today, the prevalence of toxic-tobacco use is inversely related to educational-economic level.²² (Interestingly, a recent poll indicated that 45% of Americans favor making cigarettes illegal, Stein, R. Drop in smoking rates stalls, The Washington Post, Oct.27, 2006:A10. This is not the intent of the Toxic-Tobacco Law)

The industries most affected by Prohibition were manufacturing, wholesaling, retailing, and transportation. The Toxic-Tobacco Law would also affect these industries, but this time they will have the advantage of a 5-year adjustment period in which to increase their services to legitimate businesses, compared to a 1-year adjustment period prior to Prohibition.

Similar to Prohibition, the Toxic-Tobacco Law will result in decreased federal, state and local revenues from excise and sales taxes. Lost tax revenues under the Law, however, are expected to be replaced by taxes on other goods and services purchased with dollars no longer being spent on toxic-tobacco products (i.e., "redistributed spending"¹⁷). Redistributed spending will also stimulate the manufacturing, wholesale, retail, and transportation industries. During Prohibition "redistributed spending" did not occur because consumers bought illegally produced alcoholic beverages.

Finally, in the 1920s legislation comparable to Prohibition did not exist, whereas today federal regulations over toxic substances exist. Beginning in 1970, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) started regulating toxic materials to protect American workers and consumers.²⁹ For instance, there are regulations that prohibit the manufacturing of products containing carcinogens such as asbestos.³⁰

Outlawing corporate manufacturing and importation, while not prohibiting use by adults, that is, affecting individual freedom, clearly distinguishes the intent of the proposed Toxic-Tobacco Law from that of Prohibition.

Discussion: Alternative legal remedies
Several legal strategies might halt the massive production, marketing and distribution of toxic-tobacco products in the United States. For instance, legislators in states where toxic-tobacco companies are incorporated could rescind the charters of companies that knowingly misrepresented their products.³¹ Also, state attorneys general could revoke the charters of toxic-tobacco companies if there is evidence that these companies engaged in unlawful activity.³² However, even if toxic-tobacco corporations lose their corporate status, there is no assurance that other states would not welcome them. Therefore, to ensure a successful end to the production of toxic-tobacco products in the United States, a national law is needed.

One option at the national level is for Congress to amend the Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972⁷ to include "toxic-tobacco and toxic-tobacco products," items that had been previously purposefully excluded.⁶ Then, the Consumer Product Safety Commission would have the authority to declare that toxic-tobacco products are "banned hazardous product(s)."³³ Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that the Commission would ban toxic-tobacco products after being given this authority.

Under the "commerce clause" of the U.S. Constitution,³⁴ Congress has the authority to directly regulate industry. Therefore, Congress, knowing that toxic-tobacco products are lethal¹ and addictive,⁸ has the leadership responsibility to ban their production and importation, that is, to pass the proposed Toxic-Tobacco Law.

During the process of drafting a bill for the Toxic-Tobacco Law, members of Congress will need to debate the following issues: a) length of the adjustment period (e.g., 5, 10, 20 years), b) merits of requiring a gradual reduction in production, c) maximum amount of toxic-tobacco products that each consumer may import per year, d) how foreign exporters will verify the age of buyers who mail order or use e-commerce, e) enforcement agencies, f) penalties for breaking the Law, and g) whether "federal" stores similar to state liquor stores might be needed to supply adult users after the Law goes into effect.

No part of this Act will affect the sovereignty of American Indian or Alaskan Native tribes and their right to manufacture and sell toxic-tobacco products on their reservations. Persons residing off reservations may buy or import toxic-tobacco products from American Indian and Alaskan Native tribes.

Discussion: Will the Congress need to limit the amount of products "off reservation folks" can buy at one time to discourage resale in their communities. Although the desire is not to infringe upon the sovereignty of the tribes, there is great concern for the health of all citizens. The legislation should not encourage tribes to expand their business.

If any provision of this Act or application of any provision of this Act to any person or circumstance is held to be invalid, the remainder of this Act and the application of the provisions of this Act to any other person or circumstance shall not be affected and shall continue to be enforced to the fullest extent possible.

TOXIC-TOBACCO PRODUCT- means any product made or derived from toxic-tobacco that is intended for human consumption, including any component, part, or accessory of a toxic-tobacco product (except for raw materials other than toxic-tobacco used in manufacturing a component, part, or accessory of a toxic-tobacco product).

BRAND- means a variety of toxic-tobacco product distinguished by the toxic-tobacco used, tar content, nicotine content, flavoring used, size, filtration, or packaging, logo, registered trademark or brand name, identifiable pattern of colors, or any combination of such attributes. With this Act, all branding of toxic-tobacco products will cease to exist.

CIGARETTE- The term `cigarette' has the meaning given that term by section 3(1) of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (15 U.S.C. 1332(1)), but also includes toxic-tobacco, in any form, that is functional in the product, which, because of its appearance, the type of toxic-tobacco used in the filler, or its packaging and labeling, is likely to be offered to, or purchased by, consumers as a cigarette or as roll-your-own toxic-tobacco.

CIGARETTE TOXIC-TOBACCO- The term `cigarette toxic-tobacco' means any product that consists of loose toxic-tobacco that is intended for use by consumers in a cigarette. Unless otherwise stated, the requirements for cigarettes shall also apply to cigarette toxic-tobacco.

COMMERCE- The term `commerce' has the meaning given that term by section 3(2) of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (15 U.S.C. 1332(2)).

LITTLE CIGAR- The term `little cigar' has the meaning given that term by section 3(7) of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (15 U.S.C. 1332(7)).

NICOTINE- The term `nicotine' means the chemical substance named 3-(1-Methyl-2-pyrrolidinyl) pyridine or C[10]H[14]N[2], including any salt or complex of nicotine.

PACKAGE- The term `package' means a pack, box, carton, or container of any kind or, if no other container, any wrapping (including cellophane), in which a toxic-tobacco product is offered for sale, sold, or otherwise distributed to consumers.

RETAILER- The term `retailer' means any person who sells toxic-tobacco products to individuals for personal consumption, or who operates a facility where self-service displays of toxic-tobacco products are permitted.

SMOKELESS TOXIC-TOBACO- The term `smokeless toxic-tobacco' means any toxic-tobacco product that consists of cut, ground, powdered, or leaf toxic-tobacco and that is intended to be placed in the oral or nasal cavity.

STATE- The term `State' means any State of the United States and, for purposes of this bill, includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, Wake Island, Midway Islands, Kingman Reef, Johnston Atoll, the Northern Mariana Islands, and any other trust territory or possession of the United States. The term does not include American Indian or Alaskan Native reservations.

TOXIC-TOBACCO PRODUCTS- refers to cigarettes, cigars, little cigars (cigarillos) chewing toxic-tobacco, snuff, pipe and cigarette toxic-tobacco.

TOXIC-TOBACCO PRODUCT MANUFACTURER- Term `toxic-tobacco product manufacturer' means any person, including any repacker or relabeler, who--

UNITED STATES- The term "United States" means the 50 States of the United States of America and the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, Wake Island, Midway Islands, Kingman Reef, Johnston Atoll, the Northern Mariana Islands, and any other trust territory or possession of the United States.

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2. USDHHS. Preventing Tobacco Use Among Young People: A Report of the Surgeon General. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control, S/N 017-001-00491-0, 1994, 248-56.

3. USDHHS. The Health Consequences of Involuntary Smoking. A Report of the Surgeon General. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control, DHHS Publication No. (CDC) 87-8398, 1986, 263-334.

4. Chandrasekaran, R. "FDA’s tobacco ad rules face lengthy court challenge," The Washington Post, Aug. 24, 1996:A9.

5. Blatt, R. "Curbing ads won’t work and it’s unconstitutional," The Washington Post, Sept. 8, 1996:C3.

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7. 15 USC 2051. Public Law 92-573; 86 Statute 1207, 92nd Congress, Oct. 27, 1972.

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9. USDHEW. Smoking and Health. Report of the Advisory Committee to the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service, PHS Publication No. 1103, 1964, 33.

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11. Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration. Code of Federal Regulations. Protection of Environment, 40, parts 72-80. Revised July 1, 1996. Washington DC: U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1996, part 80.22.

12. Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration. Code of Federal Regulations. Commercial Practices, 16, parts 1000 to End. Revised Jan. 1, 1996. Washington DC: U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1996, part 1303.

13. MMWR. "Cigarette smoking-attributable mortality and years of potential life lost- United States, 1990," Morb. Mortal. Wkly. Rep. 42 (1993): 645-9.

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15. Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration. Code of Federal Regulations. Protection of Environment, 40, parts 81-85. Revised July 1, 1996. Washington DC: U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1996, part 85.2203.

16. Roemer, R. Legislative Action to Combat the World Tobacco Epidemic, 2^nd Edition. Geneva: World Health Organization, 1993.

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21. Pearlstein, S. Buyout alchemy: Tobacco land into gold. The Washington Post, Oct. 22, 2006:E1.

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23. 42 USC 7545 (n). Public Law 101-549, Section 220, 101^st Congress, Nov. 15, 1990.

24. Barr, S., and Hamilton, M.M. "Clinton curtails tobacco ads in bid to cut sales to youth," The Washington Post, Aug. 24, 1996:A1, 6.

25. Pierce, J.P., Fiore, M.C., Novotny, T.E., Hatziandreu, E. J., and Davis, R.M. "Trends in cigarette smoking in the United States-Projections to the Year 2000," JAMA. 261 (1989): 61-5.

26. Nation, C.A. The Use and Need of the Life of Carry A. Nation. Topeka, Kansas: F.M. Steves and Sons, 1905.7. Rumbarger, J.J. Profits, Power, and Prohibition: Alcohol Reform and the Industrialization of America 1800-1930. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989.

28. Kyvig, D.E. Repealing National Prohibition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979.

29. U.S. Govt. Manual. Washington DC: U.S. Superintendent of Documents, 1995, 394, 523.

30. Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration. Code of Federal Regulations. Protection of Environment, 40, parts 700-789. Revised July 1, 1995. Washington DC: U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1995, part 763.160.

31. Nader, R., Green, M. and Seligman, J. Taming the Giant Corporation. New York: WW Norton and Company Inc., 1976.

32. Merritt, R.W., and Ennico, C.R., eds. Corporate Practice Handbook. New York: New York State Bar Association, 1992.

33. 15 USC 2051 sec 30 (a). Public Law 92-573; 86 Statute 1207, 92nd Congress, Oct. 27, 1972.

34. Woll, P., and Binstock, R.H. America’s Political System. New York: Random House, 1984.

Toxic-tobacco products, despite being lethal and addictive, are highly attractive and accessible to children and adults at hundreds of thousands of retail outlets. The proposed Toxic-Tobacco Law (Law) will end this access by prohibiting corporations and other legal entities from making, marketing, or importing toxic-tobacco products. The Law will go into effect five years after enactment, giving all stakeholders (e.g., farmers) time to adjust. After this adjustment period, adults will be "free" to import toxic-tobacco products for personal use. Unlike Prohibition, which sought to stop Americans from consuming alcohol, the Toxic-Tobacco Law does not seek to restrict consumption by adults. The purpose of the Law is to end the massive presence of toxic-tobacco products in American society in order to prevent the addiction of children and adults to toxic-tobacco and its devastating health consequences (e.g., lung cancer). The U.S. Congress, under the "commerce clause" of the Constitution, has the authority to pass the Toxic-Tobacco Law.

Toxic-Tobacco Law Coalition: 2006 Annual Report

1. Drafted the Toxic-Tobacco Bill (version 2.0) for the United States House of Representatives and the Senate with this preamble: To protect the public health by (1) banning for-profit corporations from making, promoting, selling or importing all toxic-tobacco products in the United States and territories subject to its jurisdiction, (2) creating the Toxic-Tobacco Authority to manufacture and sell all toxic-tobacco, and (3) authorizing the Authority to end all promotional marketing of toxic-tobacco products, raise the purchasing age to 25(current recommendation 21), reduce youth access to toxic-tobacco products, reduce the attractiveness and addictiveness of products, fund and promote prevention and cessation programs, and implement a national smoke-free air regulation. Colleagues soon will be asked for their contributions and suggestions to improve the Bill. (Please see www.toxic-tobaccolaw.org)
2. Completed a 2-page excerpt of the Toxic-Tobacco Law, used as a handout at the 13th World Conference on Tobacco or Health, July 12-15, 2006.
3. Revised and updated the "Summary of Endgames for Toxic-Tobacco: 1997-2006" and sent it to colleagues. A particularly noteworthy addition was that the 13th World Conference on Tobacco or Health, the most influential international toxic-tobacco control meeting, elevated "endgames" for the first time to the highest level of prominence – a general Plenary Session.
4. Completed the Toxic-Tobacco Law Coalition's 2005 Executive Summary and sent it to colleagues worldwide.
5. In 2006 our website, www.toxic-tobaccolaw.org, received 1,527 unique visitors per month (mean), an increase of 23.6% over 2005. The total number of visitors for 2006 was 18,324.
6. Completed the second year of posting our OnLine Petition at our website. The petition urges Congress to pass the Toxic-Tobacco Law. Continued to explore strategies to increase the number of OnLine Petition signers to reach our goal of 1,000,000 signatures.
7. Attended the National Institutes of Health (NIH) State of the Science Meeting on Toxic-Tobacco.
8. Communicated with Drs. Park (South Korea) and Zatonski (Poland) who started the Tobacco Free World Alliance. The Alliance proposes that national governments ban the manufacture and sale of tobacco products in 10-15 years. Dr. Park and others have written a 542 page book entitled Banning the manufacture and sale of tobacco products: The problems and answers (2006). Continued written communications with Drs. Koop, Seffrin, Malone, Park, and Zatonski and Ms. Callard and Mr. Dave Thompson regarding "endgames" for toxic-tobacco.
9. Invited colleagues to participate in a new discussion group on "endgames" for toxic-tobacco initiated by Mr. Dave Thompson at ti-reform@globalink.org
10. Assisted the University of Miami in its process of reviewing its policy regarding taking research funding from toxic-tobacco companies.
11. Attended Dr. C. Everett Koop's 90th birthday celebration at the Cosmos Club in Washington DC. We are grateful to Dr. Koop for the attention he has given to the Toxic-Tobacco Law Coalition and his encouragement.
12. Recognized and thanked Dr. Steve Hansen for creating a resolution for consideration by the American Medical Association House of Delegates related to removing the profit motive from the toxic-tobacco industry.
13. Reread Curing the Addiction to Profits: A supply-side approach to phasing out tobacco by Callard, Thompson and Collishaw, which we recommend to all of our colleagues. This book outlines practical mechanisms for implementing the Toxic-Tobacco Law.
    

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    Toxic-Tobacco Law Coalition: 2005 Annual Report

    This Executive Summary outlines the progress made by the Toxic-Tobacco Law Coalition and its volunteers during 2005.

    1. Drafted the first version of the Toxic-Tobacco Bill (Law) for the United States House of Representatives and Senate. During 2006, colleagues will be asked for their suggestions to improve the Bill.
    2. Added the following provisions to the Toxic-Tobacco Law: (a) limit the sale of toxic-tobacco products to adults 21 years of age and older, (b) require that all public buildings and worksites be smoke-free and (c) shorten the adjustment period between passing and implementing the Toxic-Tobacco Law from the initial proposal of 20 years.
    3. Studied Cynthia Callard, Dave Thomson and Neil Collishaw's new book: Curing the Addition to Profits: A supply-side approach to phasing out tobacco. The book compellingly argues that regardless of the restrictions governments introduce, toxic-tobacco companies will try to increase sales and thus profits. The profit motive is diametrically opposed to the public health goal of reducing the harm caused by toxic-tobacco. Therefore, Canada should purchase for-profit toxic-tobacco companies and turn them into a not-for-profit public interest corporation whose goal is to reduce the harm caused by toxic-tobacco.
    4. Publicized the above book by Callard et al. on our website and through e-mails to colleagues because it contains strategies for implementing the Toxic-Tobacco Law.
    5. Added to the "Breaking News" section of our website the fact that the National Cancer Centers of Bangladesh, China, Japan, Korea and Singapore have agreed to work on banning the manufacture, import, export and sale of toxic-tobacco products. Similar to the Toxic-Tobacco Law, the ban would go into effect after a 10-year adjustment period.
    6. Reviewed an article by George Thomson, Nick Wilson and Julian Crane (NZMJ 15 April 2005) advocating the creation of a government toxic-tobacco authority to which the toxic-tobacco industry would have to respond. This idea was credited to Borland and Liberman. The toxic-tobacco authority would control marketing, ingredients, retail venues, brandless packs and less harmful devices.
    7. Completed a summary of "endgame" strategies (1997-2005) for the toxic-tobacco industry that was sent to our public health colleagues and posted on our website. Also, sent the summary of endgames to planners of the 2006 World Conference on Tobacco or Health at their request.
    8. In 2005 our website, www.toxic-tobaccolaw.org, received 1,236 visitors per month (mean), an increase of 51% over 2004.
    9. Launched our OnLine Petition (www.toxic-tobaccolaw.org/7petition.shtml) that urges Congress to pass the Toxic-Tobacco Law. This complements our long-standing hard copy petition aimed at securing 1,000,000 signers. A "Be One in a Million" campaign will be initiated in 2006 to reach our goal.
    10. Broadcasted via e-mail the Toxic-Tobacco Law Coalition's 2004 Executive Summary to thousands of colleagues interested in stopping the predatory behavior of the toxic-tobacco industry.
    11. Sent a letter to CEO Cheryl Healton protesting the American Legacy Foundation's presenting an award to Time Inc., a collaborating vehicle for cancer stick advertising.
    12. Provided Toxic-Tobacco Law T-shirts for photo opportunities in Georgia of the former Soviet Union.
    13. Supported Washington DC's successful campaign to prohibit indoor smoking.
    14. Determined that the current level of activity of the Toxic-Tobacco Law Coalition is sustainable into the foreseeable future given its current and projected resources.

        We thank the following volunteers for their service to the Toxic-Tobacco Law Coalition:

        Terence A. Gerace, Ph.D., National Coordinator
        M. Holly Gerace, B.A., Comptroller
        Michele Lee Campoamor, J.D., Legal Counsel
        Terence A. Gerace, Jr., M.D., Medical Advisor
        Valerie George, R.D., Ph.D., Regional Coordinator
        Susan Schwartz, Research Associate
        Pam Catanzano, R.N., M.S., Public Health Consultant
        Anthony Fleg, B.A.,Youth Ambassador
        Kwang Wei Chan , Information Technology Consultant
        

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        Asia's Plan to Ban

        The National Cancer Centers of Bangladesh, China, Japan, Korea and Singapore have agreed to work on banning the manufacture, import, export and sale of toxic-tobacco products. The ban would go into effect in 10 years.

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        Toxic-Tobacco Endgames: 1997-2005

        We are pleased to bring to your attention a very important new book from Canada that outlines ways to stop the predatory behavior of the toxic-tobacco industry. This exposition by Callard, Thompson and Collishaw introduces many of the details that need to be addressed to implement the Toxic-Tobacco Law. Following the summary of their book are summaries of other recently published works on "endgames" from New Zealand, Australia, Philippines and the United States.

        1. Regardless of the regulatory tactics governments introduce, toxic-tobacco companies will react by trying to increase sales and thus profits. The profit motive is diametrically opposed to the public health goal of reducing the harm incurred by users of toxic-tobacco. Therefore, Canada should purchase the for-profit toxic-tobacco companies and turn them into a not-for-profit public interest corporation whose goal is to reduce the harm caused by toxic-tobacco. The purchase of these companies in Canada could be paid for by two years of tax revenue.
        Callard C, Thompson D, Collishaw N. Curing the addiction to profits: a supply-side approach to phasing out tobacco. Ottawa, Ontario, Canada: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives and Physicians for a Smoke-Free Canada, 2005.
        Callard C, Thompson D, Collishaw N. Transforming the tobacco market: Why the supply of cigarettes should be transferred from for-profit corporations to non-profit enterprises with a public health mandate. Tobacco Control. 2005;14:278-283.

        2. New Zealand should have a government Tobacco Authority to specify the design and ingredients of toxic-tobacco products to minimize injury, end all marketing of brands, control less toxic tobacco products and other nicotine products, and remove the profit motive from manufacturers (after Borland and Liberman's model, see below). The Tobacco Authority's goal would be harm reduction. By controlling the retail environment also, the authority could further its goal of reducing the usage of toxic-tobacco. The authority could be funded through taxes on the toxic-tobacco industry.
        Thomson G, Wilson N, Crane J. Rethinking the regulatory framework for tobacco control in New Zealand. New Zealand Medical Journal. 2005;118:1-7.

        3. "Marketing is where the power lies in the modern tobacco industry." Therefore, Australia should establish a Tobacco Products Agency (TPA) to regulate the toxic-tobacco market and service consumers while minimizing harm. A "regulated market model" would end the practice of manufacturers' designing products to increase their attractiveness and associating them with desirable lifestyles in advertisements to add value to them. The TPA would eliminate the relationship between manufacturers and consumers and phase out the dirtiest forms of toxic-tobacco products. The TPA would be the only organization to communicate with the public and control what retailers say. The TPA should be independent from government and its revenue raising agencies. "[G]rowers would sell to licensed manufacturers who would tender for market share from the TPA."
        Borland R. A strategy for controlling the marketing of tobacco products: a regulated market model. Tobacco Control. 2003;12:374-382.

        4. "... I hope to see the adoption of approaches that question the 'right' of the tobacco industry to profit in circumstances where the more harm it causes, the more money it makes. The tobacco industry has no such 'right'. It can do only what the community allows it to do.
           Australia should create a regulatory agency with "no financial interest in the sale of products" and whose primary focus is to reduce harm from toxic-tobacco. "The agency would decide what products it wanted on the market, with what ingredients, in what packaging ... , and manufacturers and retailers would compete to meet its requirements. ..."
           "[P]rofits of manufacturers and retailers come from meeting the agency's requirements, rather than in growing and sustaining markets in the ordinary way."
        Liberman J. Where to for tobacco regulation: time for new approaches? Drug and Alcohol Review. 2003;22:461-469.

        5. "The time for half measures and stricter regulations and stern warnings about the dangers of smoking has come to an end. Only the abolition of the industry can save our countrymen, particularly the younger set from acquiring the deadly habit of smoking."
           House Bill 2124, introduced by Narciso D. Monfort, MD into the Philippines Congress, aimed to phase out the toxic-tobacco industry within the next 20 years. House Bill 2124 did not pass.
        Monfert ND in Garcia CRA, reporter. Philippines: Bill proposing phaseout of cigarette, tobacco industry opposed. Business World (ph): April 3, 2002.

        6. "But a product that kills people—when used as intended—is different. No one should be allowed to make a profit from it."
           "[I]n the long term, the solution to the smoking problem rests with the bottom line, prohibiting the tobacco companies from continuing to profit from the sale of a deadly, addictive drug. These profits are inevitably used to promote that same addictive product and to generate more sales. If public health is to be the centerpiece of tobacco control—if our goal is to halt this manmade epidemic—the tobacco industry, as currently configured, needs to be dismantled."
           "Congress should charter" a corporation, "one from which no one profits, to take over manufacturing and sales."
        Kessler D. A question of intent: A great American battle with a deadly industry. New York: PublicAffairs, 2001.

        7. The Toxic-Tobacco Law will ban companies in the U.S. from making, marketing or importing cigarettes, cigars, chew, snuff, pipe tobacco, and cigarette tobacco. To provide an adjustment period, the ban will begin 5-10 years after Congress passes the Law and the president signs it.
           Unlike Prohibition, individual adults (21 and older) will be able to import toxic-tobacco products or buy them from federal stores supplied by a non-profit governmental corporation. Nationally, smoking will not be permitted in any public buildings or indoor worksites. Smoking cessation programs will be widespread and extensive countermarketing of toxic-tobacco products will take place.
           The Law will end access by youths, all advertising and other promotional marketing, the ubiquitous presence of toxic-tobacco in hundreds of thousands of retail venues, and the normalization of toxic-tobacco consumption.
        Gerace TA. The Toxic-Tobacco Law: "Appropriate remedial action." Journal of Public Health Policy. 1999;20:394-407.
        Gerace TA. Tobacco advertising and freedom of speech. Letter to the Editor. Journal of the American Medical Association. 2002;288:1586.
        Gerace TA. The Lancet's call to ban smoking in the UK. Correspondence. Lancet. 2004;363:399.

        8. It should be illegal to manufacture and sell for-profit all toxic-tobacco products. To satisfy the demands of addicted users, the United States should create a public health agency that would simultaneously provide toxic-tobacco products, smoking cessation and prevention programs.
        Smart DC. Weighing tobacco control alternatives, their illusions and realities. Unpublished manuscript 1998.

        9. As citizens of the United States, we are in an ethical dilemma because we permit manufacturers to make toxic-tobacco products that we know cause death and disability, and contain nicotine, an addictive drug. The Toxic-Tobacco Law will make it illegal for corporations in the U.S. to manufacture or import toxic-tobacco products. The Law will not prohibit farmers from growing toxic-tobacco, or adults from buying and consuming toxic-tobacco products supplied from government owned facilities.
        Gerace TA. The Toxic-Tobacco Law: "Appropriate remedial action." Unpublished manuscript, May 26,1997 .

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        Toxic-Tobacco Law Coalition: 2004 Annual Report

        This Executive Summary outlines the progress made by the Toxic-Tobacco Law Coalition and its volunteers during 2004.

        1. Lancet published our response to its editorial that called for a total ban on toxic-tobacco in the U.K (2004;363:399). This is the second time that an international medical journal has outlined the Toxic-Tobacco Law. Dr. Koop gave us permission to quote him in the Lancet saying the Toxic-Tobacco Law "has great merit." This correspondence also mentioned former FDA commissioner Kessler's conversion to supporting the dismantling of the toxic-tobacco industry and Dr. Monfort's similar conviction in the bill he offered the Philippines House of Representatives.
        2. Visits per month to www.Toxic-TobaccoLaw.org increased 138% from 2003 to 2004 (means = 345 and 821, respectively).
        3. Revised our paper "Cost-free countermarketing: Big Tobacco versus toxic-tobacco companies" for sequential submissions to the American Journal of Preventive Medicine, New England Journal of Medicine and the Lancet.
        4. Submitted a letter to the editor of the Washington Post that responded to Brandt and Richardson's op-ed piece called "Tobacco Pandemic".
        5. Broadcasted via e-mail the Toxic-Tobacco Law Coalition's 2003 Annual Report to public health leaders and thousands of colleagues.
        6. Presented a letter to Cheryl Healton, CEO, American Legacy Foundation, urging that her Foundation be prudent in working with CVS at five of its drug stores to counsel smokers to quit smoking. Our letter pointed out that the hypocrisy of CVS's intervening on smoking while greatly profiting by promoting and supplying cigarettes will not go unnoticed by the media.
        7. Placed Toxic-Tobacco Law brochures at a convenience store in Washington, DC that no longer sells toxic-tobacco products.
        8. Sent the Washington Post a letter to the editor arguing against its editorial supporting S.2461, a senate bill purportedly giving the FDA regulatory authority over the toxic-tobacco industry.
        9. Composed four letters to congressional sponsors (Kennedy, Dewine, Waxman and Davis) asking them to reconsider S.2461 and H.R.4433 (see previous item). Copies also went to public health leaders.
        10. Supported Dr. Michael Siegel's coalition against the FDA regulatory amendment (formerly S.2461) to S.1637.
        11. Distributed 19 dissenting letters to staffers of Senators who were members of the conference committee that worked on the FDA regulatory amendment (formerly S.2461) to S.1637.
        12. Faxed the message "Philip Morris wants these FDA regulations. How RED does the flag have to be?" to representatives and senators on the congressional conference committee considering the amendment that would authorize the FDA to regulate toxic-tobacco.
        13. Submitted two letters to the editor and an op-ed piece to the Washington Post arguing against proposed legislation to give the FDA regulatory authority over the toxic-tobacco industry. One letter was accepted and then rejected.
        14. Composed a short essay on "endgames" for toxic-tobacco and sent it to 114 toxic-tobacco activists. Received 16 replies that have formed the basis for future discussions and plans. Replied to the respondents individually and also to the entire group.

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            Regulating the FDA Helps Marlboro

            August 24, 2004

            To the Editor:

            The Post may stop urging Congress to "give the Food and Drug Administration regulatory authority over tobacco products"[editorial, Aug 20] after learning the devilish details in the enabling legislation. For example, it would forbid the FDA from raising the purchasing age above 18, determining where tobacco may be sold, or reducing nicotine to zero in tobacco products.

            Philip Morris USA Inc. is sponsoring this legislation to convince us that it is a "good corporate citizen", yet its best selling Marlboro flip-top box would be exempted from the required warning label on its front and rear panels. Philip Morris supports spending $138 million per year in "user fees" to pay the FDA's cost of collaborating (e.g., salaries) in search of "reduced-risk" cigarettes. This is a small price to pay to keep its revenues high ($4.6 billion, second quarter of 2004), and further legitimize itself by being able to describe its products as "US Government Approved" and "FDA sanctioned," protecting it from future liability suits and increasing sales.

            Charging the FDA with supervising the creation of a safer cigarette invites an endless game during which new generations will become addicted to tobacco and the public will be lulled into thinking that a "safe cigarette" is around the corner. Tobacco companies have taken us down this unending road before, beginning in the 1950s with filtered cigarettes and continuing into the 1970s with "low tar" cigarettes. For its predatory behavior, Philip Morris recently lost a $10.1 billion suit that found the company guilty of deceiving smokers into believing that "low tar" and "low nicotine" cigarettes were safer than regular cigarettes.

            The FDA regulations at issue will not produce a safe cigarette, reduce youth access to tobacco, aid adults in quitting, reduce the 440,000 deaths caused by tobacco yearly, or lessen the 8.6 million Americans chronically suffering from cancer, heart disease, stroke and emphysema.

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            Toxic-Tobacco Law in The Lancet

            On December 6, 2003 (p 1865), The Lancet, one of the world's most influential medical journals, demanded that the United Kingdom ban toxic-tobacco. The editors reasoned that "If tobacco were an illegal substance ... the number of smokers would drastically fall."

            We appreciate the journal's message that an endgame is urgently needed to halt the ever expanding epidemic caused by toxic-tobacco, but we disagree with its plan. We also thank The Lancet for rightfully making the Toxic-Tobacco Law appear less draconian and more feasible politically.

            On January 31, 2004, The Lancet published our correspondence (aka "letter to the editor") which included a description of the Toxic-Tobacco Law.

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            Surgeon General OK on Toxic-Tobacco Ban

            Surgeon General Richard H. Carmona, M.D., shocked supporters of toxic-tobacco in Congress and the White House when he said that he "would support banning or abolishing tobacco products." He also said that "I see no need for any tobacco products in society."

            Representative Ed Whitfield (R-Ky.) said "I've never heard anything like that from any public official." (The Washington Post, June 4, 2003, A1.)

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            Cancer Doctors Plan Prevention

            The American Society of Clinical Oncology, composed of doctors who treat cancer patients, committed itself to taking a leadership role in preventing cancer caused by toxic-tobacco. The Society plans to support a commission that will examine the economic and regulatory issues among others, with the ultimate goal of creating a toxic-tobacco free planet. (Pollack, A. The New York Times, May 31, 2003, 25)

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            Co$t-free countermarketing: "Big Tobacco" versus "toxic-tobacco companies"

            The Journal of the American Medical Association recently rejected the above titled manuscript. The abstract below summarizes the manuscript.

            As long as cigarette companies are permitted to advertise to each new generation, cost-effective and cost-free countermarketing techniques will be needed to discredit their fraudulent ads and to highlight the harm caused by their products. This paper describes a cost-free countermarketing proposal that urges tobacco control advocates to substitute the words "toxic-tobacco" for tobacco and "toxic-tobacco companies" for Big Tobacco in all press releases, speeches; radio, television and newspaper interviews, proposed legislation and counteradvertisements. Then, the mass media (e.g., newspapers) will have to use these substitutions which will reinforce the message that tobacco is poisonous for those who know, and educate those who do not know. At the same time these substitutions will challenge the credibility and acceptability of tobacco companies in civilized society.

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            Toxic-Tobacco Law Coalition: 2003 Annual Report

            This report summarizes the progress made by the volunteers of the Toxic-Tobacco Law Coalition during 2003.

            1. Established our new website on a UICC (International Union Against Cancer) GLOBALink server (The International Tobacco-Control Network) in Geneva, Switzerland.
            2. Submitted our website address, www.Toxic-TobaccoLaw.org, to Google.com (Jan. 10). Visits to our website have increased from 82 per month in Jan. 2003 to 544 per month in Dec. 2003, a 563% increase.
            3. Sent a list of descriptive terms that form the acronym Altria such as Acronym lofted to reduce image attacks to public health leaders including John Seffrin, American Cancer Society, Mathew Myers, Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids and Cheryl Healton, American Legacy Foundation, after Philip Morris Inc. changed its name to Altria Group Inc. (Jan. 29).
            4. Submitted our manuscript Cost-free countermarketing: "Big Tobacco" versus "toxic-tobacco companies" after previous rejection to Public Health Reports (Feb. 27), the Journal of Public Health Policy (Apr.18) and Journal of the American Medical Association (Aug. 4).
            5. Sent 2002 Annual Report Executive Summary to public health leaders and thousands of colleagues on our emailing list (Mar.10).
            6. Sent e-mail announcements of our new website to our extensive mailing list based on attendees at the 11th World Conference on Tobacco or Health (May 7-Jul. 3).
            7. Corresponded with the President of the American Society of Clinical Oncology, Paul Bunn, regarding our support of the society's commitment to creating a smoke-free world and our perspective on the Toxic-Tobacco Law as an endgame (June 5).
            8. Attended a rally sponsored by SmokeFree DC to give our support to this effort to ban toxic-tobacco smoke from all worksites and indoor public places in the capital of the United States (Sept. 17). The voters will determine the fate of the resolution on November 2, 2004.
            9. Corresponded with the American Cancer Society regarding our mutual aim to reduce the disease toll caused by toxic-tobacco (Oct. 1).
            10. Wrote an op-ed piece for the Washington Post on Congress, a proposal for Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to regulate toxic-tobacco, and the Toxic-Tobacco Law as an alternative endgame (Oct. 2). The piece was submitted after thirteen out of fourteen colleagues, including former Surgeon General C. Everett Koop, responded to our request for editorial comments. Unfortunately, the Washington Post did not run any pieces on FDA regulation after Congress stopped negotiating on this issue.
            11. Sent The Lancet a correspondence responding to its editorial calling on the UK government to ban toxic-tobacco and criminalize its use (Dec. 12). The correspondence outlined the Toxic-Tobacco Law, and spotlighted a like bill offered to the Philippines Congress and David Kessler's (former FDA Commissioner) call to dismantle the industry instead of regulating it. The Lancet published the correspondence on Jan. 31, 2004.

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            Toxic-Tobacco Law Coalition: 2002 Annual Report

            This Executive Summary outlines the progress made by the Toxic-Tobacco Law Coalition and its volunteers during 2002.

            1. Launched our new website www.Toxic-TobaccoLaw.org after selecting and editing archived content and creating new material. Kwang Wei Chan, our Information Technology Consultant at Purdue University, collaborated greatly in designing and constructing our website. Our site is hosted by the International Union Against Cancer (UICC) GlobaLink in Geneva, Switzerland.
            2. Encouraged high school students in Ocean City, NJ to collect Toxic-Tobacco Law petition signatures from other students.
            3. Sent out petitions and brochures to volunteers in Florida, New Jersey and New York.
            4. Received our first petition signatures from Texas, bringing the number of represented states to 19 states, plus Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia.
            5. Received our largest single day number of petition signatures from Norma Hall in Miami, FL.
            6. Accepted our second largest single day number of petition signatures from Valerie George and Sten Henricksen from South Florida.
            7. Wrote a letter to the editor of the American Journal of Public Health (AJPH) responding to three articles published in the March 2002 issue that describe the difficulty of regulating advertising of toxic-tobacco products. The letter was rejected, but it was sent to the authors of the published articles.
            8. Publicized Representative Monfort's bill (HB 2124) in the Philippines Congress that calls for stopping all expansion of the toxic-tobacco industry and setting up a presidential commission to design the dismantling of the toxic-tobacco industry over the next 20 years. Dr. Monfort asked for our assistance and we sent him a detailed paper regarding issues that need to be considered in the context of his bill. HB 2124 is a very important precedent for the Toxic-Tobacco Law.
            9. Supported the Student Coalition Against Tobacco (SCAT) Tobacco Free Youth Rally at Lincoln Memorial on May 1, 2002 and met Tom Gahr, student advisor.
            10. Wrote an article entitled Cost-free countermarketing: "Big tobacco" vs. "toxic-tobacco companies" that was rejected without outside review by Tobacco Control and the American Journal of Public Health. After another rejection (Public Health Reports), we submitted the manuscript to the Journal of Public Health Policy.
            11. Sent six T-shirts to Puerto Rico for a photo shoot of teenage supporters. The results of the shoot will appear on our website.
            12. First letter to editor on the Toxic-Tobacco Law published October 2, 2002 in the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA).

            The following individuals continue to volunteer their services to the Toxic-Tobacco Law Coalition:

            Terence A. Gerace, Ph.D., National Coordinator
            M. Holly Gerace, B.A., Comptroller
            Michele Lee Campoamor, J.D., Legal Counsel
            Terence A. Gerace, Jr., M.D., Medical Advisor
            Valerie George, R.D., Ph.D., Regional Coordinator
            Susan Schwartz, Research Associate
            Pam Catanzano, R.N., M.S., Public Health Consultant
            Anthony Fleg, B.A.,Youth Ambassador
            Kwang Wei Chan , Information Technology Consultant
            

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            Toxic-Tobacco Law in the Journal of the American Medical Association

            Please check out our Letter to the Editor in the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA), October 2, 2002, and the response to the letter. You may register as a guest to have free access to this section of the Journal.

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            Philip Morris=Altria

            Acronym lofted to reduce image attacks.
            Absorb large tobacco relationship in alias.
            Always loathing tobacco regulations in America.
            Angina, lungs, toxins, respiratory illnesses, atherosclerosis.
            Acting like tobacco relationship is absent.
            Alias letting tobacco raise income always.
            Artificial label to reduce incriminating accusations.
            Aim, lose tobacco relationship in alias.
            Alcohol, lunches, tobacco rolled into alias.
            Alias launched to reduce incriminating accusations.
            A label to reduce image attacks.
            Alias lowering tobacco rogues' image aggravation.
            Alternative label to reduce image acne.
            Alternative label to restore image acceptance.
            

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            The Toxic-Tobacco Law Goes 'Round the World

            Arguably one of the most important events related to the Toxic-Tobacco Law (1,2) recently occurred thousands of miles from the United States when Dr. Monfort, representative in the Philippines Congress, introduced House Bill 2124.

            This bill calls for:
            1) Banning the introduction of new cigarette or toxic-tobacco companies in the Philippines,
            2) Forbidding current cigarette and toxic-tobacco companies from expanding their production capabilities, and
            3) Establishing a presidential commission to design the process of phasing out the toxic-tobacco and cigarette industries.

            Monfort's bill "is aimed at the gradual phaseout of the toxic-tobacco industry within the next 20 years" (3).

            The National Tobacco Administration (regulator of Philippines tobacco industry), a major opponent of the bill (along with Philip Morris), says that it opposes proposals that would reduce tobacco leaf production by farmers; but at the same time urges that if this bill is enacted, it needs to include well-defined measures to counter the economic consequences (3).

            "'The time for half measures and stricter regulations and stern warnings about the dangers of smoking has come to an end. Only the abolition of the industry can save our countrymen (and women), particularly the younger set from acquiring the deadly habit of smoking,' Mr. Monfort said (3)."

            References
            1. Gerace, TA. The Toxic-Tobacco Law: "Appropriate Remedial Action". Journal of Public Health Policy,1999;20:394-407.
            2. Gerace, TA. Tobacco advertising and freedom of speech. Journal of the American Medical Association,2002;288:1586.
            3. Garcia, Cathy Rose A. "Philippines: Bill Proposing Phaseout of Cigarette, Tobacco Industry Opposed," Business World (ph) April 3, 2002.
            
            

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